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Abstract
Under the Paris Agreement, parties set and implement their own emissions targets as nationally
determined contributions (NDCs) to tackle climate change. International carbon emissions trading is
expected to reduce globalmitigation costs. Here, we show the beneﬁt of emissions trading under both
NDCs and amore ambitious reduction scenario consistent with the 2 °Cgoal. The results show that
the global welfare loss, whichwasmeasured based on estimated household consumption change in
2030, decreased by 75% (from 0.47% to 0.16%), as a consequence of achievingNDCs through
emissions trading. Furthermore, achieving the 2 °C targets without emissions trading led to a global
welfare loss of 1.4%–3.4%, depending on the burden-sharing scheme used, whereas emissions trading
reduced the loss to around 1.5% (from1.4% to 1.7%). These results indicate that emissions trading is a
valuable option for the international system, enablingNDCs andmore ambitious targets to be
achieved in a cost-effectivemanner.
Abbreviations
AIM Asia-Paciﬁc Integrated
Model
CES Constant elasticity of
substitution
CGE Computable general
equilibrium
COP Conference of the Parties
ET Emissions trading
INDCs Intended nationally
determined contributions
OECD Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and
Development
UNFCCC UnitedNations Frame-
workConvention onCli-
mate Change
Introduction
In 2015, the Conference of the Parties (COP) 21 to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) adopted the Paris Agreement [1].
The Paris Agreement provides a framework for global
actions to address climate change in the period after
2020. The objective of the agreement was to maintain
the increase in global temperatures well below 2 °C
above pre-industrial levels, whilst making efforts to
limit the increase to 1.5 °C.
The Paris Agreement requires Parties to prepare
nationally determined contributions (NDCs), indicat-
ing an individual country’s emissions reduction com-
mitments, the measures to be taken to achieve their
objectives, and a requirement to report on progress.
To raise the level of ambition over time, parties must
submit updated NDCs every 5 years. Each party’s new
NDCmust be more ambitious than its previous NDC.
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Over 180 parties to the UNFCCC communicated their
intended nationally determined contributions
(INDCs) for 2025/2030 before COP21.
There have already been several assessments rela-
ted to INDCs published in scientiﬁc papers reports
and on websites [2–10]. Some propose alternative sce-
narios to achieve the 2 °C goal because the INDC
based emissions are larger than those in the 2 °C sce-
narios. Some are comparable with the recent Fifth
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC AR5) scenario database [11],
and make allocations based on multiple effort-sharing
schemes. The consensus across the assessments at this
stage is that current INDCs are not in linewith the 2 °C
goal, which was also stated in the Paris Agreement [1].
To achieve the 2 °C goal, either a further emissions
reduction in 2030 or more drastic and rapid reduc-
tions are required afterwards.
Combating climate change will require the mobili-
zation of substantial resources. Success will depend on
the establishment of mechanisms and approaches that
incentivize the mobilization of resources for cost-effec-
tive and ambitiousmitigation action at all levels. Coop-
eration among parties and private and public-sector
stakeholders is considered crucial. It is well-known that
the international carbon emissions trading system is an
economically cost-effective way to reduce global total
mitigation cost [12–17]4. Under the Kyoto Protocol,
there are several such systems incorporating market
mechanisms, namely international emissions trading,
the clean development mechanism (CDM), and joint
implementation. They enable parties to reduce emis-
sions cost effectively and encourage the private sector to
contribute to global emissions reduction.
However, there are also some difﬁculties with
implementing the market mechanism. For example,
systems for monitoring, reporting, and veriﬁcation
(MRV) of the emissions reduction are needed, but this
imposes certain costs. Another issue is that if we estab-
lish a carbon market, we need to prepare the market
infrastructure, with a positive carbon price being a
necessity. For regarding the post-2020 climate actions,
there have been some developments regarding the
international transaction of carbon credit under bilat-
eral agreements such as The Joint Crediting Mech-
anism by the government of Japan. Article 6 of the
Paris Agreement provides a foundation to undertake
international transfers of mitigation outcomes
between parties. However, there have been no studies
to clarify the effectiveness of an emissions trading sys-
tem in the context of INDCs.
Here, we estimate the effectiveness of emissions
trading under the current INDCs and under the more
ambitious reduction targets for 2030, which are con-
sistent with the 2 °C scenarios in the AR5 database
[11]. The more stringent emissions reduction targets
are associated with larger costs, making emissions
trading important. We used the Asia-Paciﬁc Inte-
grated Model/Computable General Equilibrium
(AIM/CGE)model to achieve this goal.
Materials andmethods
Model
We used the AIM/CGE model. The CGE model used
in this study is a recursive, dynamic, general equili-
briummodel that covers all regions of the world and is
widely used in climate mitigation and impact studies
[18–22]. There are other global CGEmodels that assess
climate policy such as EPPA [23] and IMACLIM [24].
Among such CGE models, AIM/CGE has unique
characteristics in its detailed representation of agricul-
ture, land, and energy supply sectors. In addition,
AIM/CGE has been used for Asian-speciﬁc analyses
[20, 25, 26].
The main inputs of the model are the socio-
economic assumptions of drivers of GHG emissions
such as population, gross domestic product (GDP),
energy technology, and dietary preference. The pro-
duction and consumption of all goods, and GHG
emissions are the main outputs as the result of price
equilibrium. Here, population and GDP assumptions
under shared socioeconomic pathways [27] SSP2
were used as the basic drivers, and other technological
assumptions were based on Fujimori, Hasegawa [28]
(the energy technology is also follows this assump-
tion). The model classiﬁes the world into 17 geopoli-
tical regions and 42 industrial classiﬁcations (see
supporting information [SI] section 1 for a list of the
regions and industries).
One characteristic of industrial classiﬁcation is
that energy sectors, including power sectors, are dis-
aggregated in detail, because energy systems and tech-
nological descriptions are crucial for the purposes of
this study. Moreover, to appropriately assess bioe-
nergy and land-use competition appropriately, agri-
cultural sectors are highly disaggregated [29]. Details
of the model structure and its mathematical formulas
are provided by Fujimori,Masui [30].
Production sectors are assumed tomaximize prof-
its under multi-nested constant elasticity substitution
(CES) functions at each input price. Energy transfor-
mation sectors input energy and are value-added as a
ﬁxed coefﬁcient, whereas energy end-use sectors have
elasticities between energy and the value-added. They
are treated in this manner to deal appropriately with
energy conversion efﬁciency in the energy transforma-
tion sectors. Power generation from several energy
sources is combined with a logit function [31],
although a CES function is often used in other CGE
models. We chose this method to consider energy bal-
ance because the CES function does not guarantee a
material balance [32]. As discussed in Fujimori, Hase-
gawa [29], the material balance violation in the CES
4
The ﬁnancial mechanism in the context of supporting the least
developed countries and technological transfer.
2
Environ. Res. Lett. 11 (2016) 104001
would not be crucial if the share was similar to the cali-
brated information. In this study, climate mitigation
should change the power generation mix when com-
pared to that of the base year, therefore, this is a key
treatment. The variable renewable energy cost
assumption is shown in SI section 2. Household
expenditures on each commodity are described by a
linear expenditure system function. The saving ratio is
endogenously determined to balance saving and
investment, and capital formation for each item is
determined by a ﬁxed coefﬁcient. The Armington
assumption which assumes imperfect substitutability
between domestically produced and traded goods [33]
is used for trade, and the current account is assumed to
be balanced.
In addition to energy-related CO2 emissions, CO2
from other sources, CH4, and N2O (including changes
resulting from land use and non-energy related emis-
sions), are included as GHG emissions in this model.
Global warming potentials are used considering the
emissions of the six gases stated in theKyoto protocol.
Once an emission constraint is placed on a region,
the carbon tax becomes a complementary variable to
that constraint. This tax raises the price of fossil fuel
goods when emissions are constrained, and promotes
energy savings and the substitution of fossil fuels by
energy sources with lower emissions. The emissions
tax, called the GHG emission price, is an incentive to
reduce non-energy-related emissions. The revenue
from this tax is assumed to go to households.
If emissions trading is allowed, every region is
assumed to import or export emission rights until
each region’s emission price reaches the international
emissions price. This trading can be described by
equation (1), which is treated as a part of the formula
for themixed complementarity problem.
^
^ ( )
 
 
ET 0 PGHG PET,
ET 0 PET PGHG ,
1r r
r r
imp
exp
where ET rimp is the net emission imports of region r,
ET rexp is the net emission exports of region r, and PET
is the international emission price.
CGE models generally use a social accounting
matrix (SAM) to calibrate the model parameters. To
assess energy ﬂow and GHG emissions more precisely
and more realistically, the CGEmodel should account
not only for the original SAM, but also for energy sta-
tistics. The Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) [34]
and energy balance tables [35, 36] were used as the
basis for the SAM and energy balance table, and data
were reconciled with other international statistics,
such as national account statistics [37]. The concept
behind the reconciliation method is described by Fuji-
mori andMatsuoka [38]. GHG and air pollutant emis-
sions were calibrated to EDGAR4.2 [39]. For the land
use and agriculture sectors, agricultural statistics [40],
land use RCP data [41], and GTAP data [42]were used
as physical data.
Scenario framework
In our model, the emissions targets as pledged in the
INDCs bind the emissions in individual countries, and
the carbon price works to achieve the targets. This, in
turn, generates climate mitigation costs, which are
measured by changes in macroeconomic indicators,
such as GDP and consumption, compared to the
baseline. We set eleven scenarios as shown in table 1.
Baseline has no climate policy (carbon pricing policy),
whereas the other scenarios do. INDC corresponds to
the unconditional emissions targets submitted to the
UNFCCC (the details of how to construct the emis-
sions constraint in 2030 are shown in SI section 3). In
addition, a more stringent climate policy scenario
Table 1. Scenario list.
Scenario name Emissions target Emissions trading Global emissions
Baseline None None
INDC_w/oET Based on INDCs without Around 53GtCO2eq in 2030 derived
from INDCs
INDC_w/ET with
40Gt_CUMw/oET Additional reductions to INDCs are based on
cumulative emissions
without
40Gt_CUMw/ET with
40Gt_GDPw/oET Additional reductions to INDCs are based
onGDP
without
40Gt_GDPw/ET with
40Gt_POPw/oET Additional reductions to INDCs are based on
population
without Around 40GtCO2eq in 2030 derived
from 2°Cgoal
40Gt_POPw/ET with
40Gt_EMIw/oET Additional reductions to INDCs are based on
baseline emissions
without
40Gt_EMIw/ET with
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group of 40 Gt was prepared, as shown in ﬁgure 1, to
limit the global total GHG emissions to about 40
GtCO2eq yr
–1 in 2030, which in the Paris Agreement is
regarded as a requirement to achieve the 2 °C goal in
line with AR5 database [11]. The 40 Gt scenarios
consisted of twodimensions, namely a burden-sharing
scheme and the availability of emissions trading. The
burden-sharing scheme is one of the key elements that
determines the stringency of the mitigation target for
an individual country. Four cases were used for the
burden-sharing scheme. The basic idea was to dis-
tribute the 13 GtCO2eq, which is the gap between the
40 Gt and INDC scenarios (see SI section 4), based on
four indicators as shown below:
= - ⋅ å Î
( )I
I
EC INDC GAP , 2r b r
r b
rp R rp b
,
,
,
where r, Îrp R is a set of regions, ECr b, is an emissions
constraint in region r under a burden-sharing scheme
b, INDCr is the emissions target in region r pledged in
the INDCs, GAP is the emissions gap in 2030 between
the INDCs (53 Gt) and 40 Gt scenarios, and Ir b,
represents indicators in region runder burden-sharing
scheme b.
The four indicators for burden sharing are cumu-
lative emissions (from 1990 to 2030 in the baseline),
GDP, population in 2030, and emissions in baseline
2030, which were referred to as CUM, GDP, POP, and
EMI, respectively. We chose these four indicators with
the consideration of concept of responsibility, cap-
ability, and equity as well as the simplicity of themodel
computation. CUM and GDP reﬂect the concept of
responsibility, although their meanings for individual
countries are different. Cumulative emissions are gen-
erally more severe in high-income countries that have
emitted substantial amounts from 1990. The GDP
indicator requires relatively large reductions for
regions with a low emissions intensity (CO2/GDP),
which is most developing countries. POP and EMI are
more related to the equality concept. EMI eventually
causes the same additional reduction rate relative to
the INDCs (20.0%=13/65=gap/baseline in 2030)
for all regions. The emissions reduction percentages
compared to the baseline for each scenario are pre-
sented in the SI section 5. We considered with (w/)
and without (w/o) emissions trading (ET) options for
all scenarios (e.g. w/ET and w/o ET). If emissions
trading was allowed, every region was assumed to
import or export emission rights freely until each
region’s emissions price reached the international
level.
Results
Welfare change andmitigation cost under INDCs
Emissions trading signiﬁcantly reduced global welfare
loss (accounted for by Hicks’ equivalent variation) in
2030 by 75% (equivalent to aroundUS$220 billion), as
shown in ﬁgure 2 (GDP loss is shown in SI section 6).
The INDC w/o ET resulted in a 0.5% (0.47%) welfare
loss in 2030 globally, but in the scenario w/ET the loss
became 0.2% (0.16%). The OECD countries tended to
have larger losses in the scenario w/o ET, whereas
their losses substantially decreased in the scenario w/
ET. For example, Japan, the US, and EU had 0.6%,
0.8%, and 0.5% welfare loss in 2030, respectively,
whereas emissions trading decreased their losses to
−0.3%, 0.3%, and −0.0%, respectively (the negative
value was due to changes in the international price and
trade conditions). A similar trend was observed in the
GDP loss rates.
Figure 1.Overview of the global emissions trajectory. The baseline assumes the absence of a climate policy. INDC refers to a scenario
meeting emissions derived from the intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) (here thew/o scenario is shown, with
global total emissions in thew/ andw/o emission trading [ET] scenarios being almost the same). Here, 40Gt is a 40GtCO2eq
scenario, which corresponds to the least-cost 2 °C scenario addressed in the Paris Agreement (here 40Gt_CUMw/ET is shown as a
representative, while other 40Gt scenarios also had similar emissions trajectories). The AR5-baseline is the scenario without the
climate policy taken from IPCCAR5database [11]which includesmulti-model andmulti-scenario results. TheAR5-2 degree is a
scenario that approximatelymeets the 2 °C target in this century.
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In contrast, the situation varied in developing
countries. For example, China and India would face a
negative economic impact due to emissions trading,
while Africa and South Asia would experience positive
impacts. As shown in ﬁgure 3, the carbon prices in
developing countries were low (almost negligible) in
the w/o ET scenario. If the domestic carbon market
were to be opened to the internationalmarket, the car-
bon prices in these regions would be elevated to 9
$/tCO2. While this is low compared to the values
obtained in long-term stringent mitigation studies
[43], there would still be somemacroeconomic effects.
It would decrease capital productivity and could result
in these regions losing their international competitive-
ness, but this would depend on the energy mix and
economic structure. In principle, in the scenario with-
out emissions trading, OECD countries have a rela-
tively high carbon price, which reduces international
competitiveness in their export industries.Meanwhile,
in the scenario with emissions trading, OECD coun-
tries regain their international competitiveness, and
eventually the rest of the world loses with regard to
exports. The results indicate that the effects of such
trade conditions are much larger than the pure carbon
Figure 2.Welfare loss rates in the year 2030 compared to the baseline scenarios for all of the regions in the INDC_w/ET and
INDC_w/o ET scenarios. The blue area is the global total and the red area isOECDcountries.
Figure 3.Carbon prices for all regions in the INDC_w/ET and INDC_w/oET scenarios. The blue area is the global total and the red
area isOECDcountries.
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emissions permit transfer effects in some countries
(the total share of exports in GDP relative to the base-
line scenario for each scenario is shown in SI section
6). The impacts would differ depending on themagni-
tude of the carbon price. For example, in countries
with a high coal consumption there would be a rela-
tively large impact on the economy at a certain carbon
price. China and India are such examples (see SI in
section 7 for the sources of primary energy supply and
power generation in representative regions as well as
other energy-related and land-related variables).
In terms of the ﬁnancial ﬂow associated with emis-
sions trading, money was transferred from OECD to
non-OECD countries because OECD countries
imported emissions from non-OECD countries.
These imports helped to reduce the mitigation cost in
OECD countries. The global ﬁnancial ﬂows were
about $38 billion in 2030. As shown previously, the
carbon prices inOECD countries were high in the w/o
ET scenario, and these countries faced relatively large
challenges in meeting their emissions target. Hence,
they purchased emissions rights from non-OECD
countries. In OECD countries, the monetary ﬂow in
the w/ET scenario (ﬁgure 4) and the welfare loss rates
in the w/o ET scenario in the US and EUwere remark-
ably high (ﬁgure 2). The monetary ﬂow in Japan was
not as high, but there were large welfare losses in the
w/o ET scenario (ﬁgure 2). This is because the scale of
the economy (GDP) in the US and EU is 3.5 and 3.0
times larger than in Japan, respectively. In non-OECD
countries, India, sub-Saharan Africa, and China were
the main exporters. Their exported monetary amount
ranged fromUS$5 to 10 billion yr–1.
Some may think that China should be a high CO2
emitter and importer of emissions permits. However,
China has historically exhibited a strong energy and
carbon intensity improvements, with an annual car-
bon intensity improvement rate of 3.0% from 1971 to
2010 (4% from 1990 to 2010). Meanwhile, the NDC
commitment is a 60%–65% decrease over 25 years,
equivalent to a 3.5% decrease per annum. Therefore, it
is not surprising that China’s carbon price in the
INDC scenario is low, or that China becomes an
exporter of permits. However, we it remains an uncer-
tainty in this study.
Stringent emissions reduction targets and
effectiveness of emissions trading
Figure 5 shows several factors regarding the welfare
losses in stringent emissions reduction target scenar-
ios. First, the mitigation costs under stringent climate
targets were signiﬁcantly larger than INDCs. Global
welfare loss without emissions trading scenarios
ranged from 1.4% to 3.4% (US$1020–2469 billion)
depending on the exact burden-sharing scheme used.
GDP loss also displayed a similar trend to welfare loss
(see SI section 8).
Second, while the global welfare losses in the w/o
ET scenarios differed, they converged to around 1.5%
in the w/ET scenarios regardless of the burden-shar-
ing scheme used. The welfare loss was dramatically
reduced by emissions trading in most of the stringent
climate target cases, ranging from 1.4% to 1.7%,
whichmeans emissions trading had an effectiveness of
0.1%–1.8% (equivalent to US$30–1240 billion). How-
ever, this was not the case for individual regions. For
example, welfare losses in OECD regions ranged from
0.5% to 3.0% inw/ET scenarios, which implies that an
initial allocation in the emissions allowance does
Figure 4.Monetary transfer associatedwith emissions trading in the INDC_w/ET scenario in 2030. The blue area is the global total
and the red area isOECD countries.
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matter for individual regions, even if emissions trading
is available.
Third, there was a completely different situation
across regions in the w/o ET scenarios depending on
the burden-sharing scheme. In CUM, the OECD
countries had the largest loss among the four burden-
sharing schemes, and this loss dominated the global
total GDP loss. This is because CUM is themost severe
burden-sharing scheme for OECD countries, where
an extremely high (more than $500/tCO2) carbon
price is set (see SI section 8.3). In GDP case, the welfare
loss in OECD countries was almost as low as in the
INDCs scenario, whereas non-OECD countries
experienced a large loss. This is because the emissions
reduction in the GDP case was relatively modest for
the OECD countries. CUM is the most severe case for
OECD regions and causes the highest mitigation cost,
whereas the GDP case required a large GHG reduction
and resulted in the highest mitigation costs in non-
OECD regions. This implies that OECD countries
have a large share of the global economy and already
face high costs in their INDC; therefore, the marginal
cost increase caused by further emissions reductions is
quite high in these regions. SI section 8.4 shows indivi-
dual sectors’ marginal abatement reduction rate
curves, from which we can conﬁrm that there is a ﬂat
trend in the low carbon price areas, but the steepness
of the curves increases in the high carbon price areas.
Fourth, the net global beneﬁts of emissions trading
differed across the different burden-sharing schemes.
Emissions trading generated most global beneﬁts in
the CUM case, mostly from the OECD countries (the
absolute GDP difference is shown in SI section 8.2). In
contrast, emissions trading generated very little beneﬁt
in the GDP case. This is probably because the carbon
price variation in the GDP case was smaller than in
other cases (see SI section 8.3). POP resulted in a global
welfare beneﬁt of 0.9% from emissions trading,
mainly due to gains in Asian (India) and African
regions (see SI section 8.1). Asia has a high population,
and therefore the required reduction as well as the
mitigation cost would increase in the POPw/o ET sce-
nario, while emissions trading substantially reduced
the costs. In EMI, all regions had to reduce the emis-
sions by the same percentage from their individual
INDCs, and therefore the beneﬁts of emissions trading
were shared among all regions.
Discussion and conclusion
We estimated the beneﬁt of emissions trading under
the current INDCs and more ambitious reduction
targets in line with the 2 °C goal for 2030. The results
indicated that emissions trading is a useful option for
the international system to efﬁciently achieve the near-
term climate target. The climate mitigation costs
under current INDCs in OECD countries would
reduce signiﬁcantly with emissions trading. However,
some regions would face negative economic impacts
due to the high carbon price. In the more ambitious
reduction target scenarios, emissions trading played
an essential role. Without emissions trading, OECD
countries could face signiﬁcant macroeconomic losses
and somewhat unrealistically high carbon prices in
most burden sharing cases.
Emissions trading is an attractive measure to
achieve the INDC targets efﬁciently, with the resulting
carbon market being around US$40 billion. However,
there are at least three factors to consider. First, who
Figure 5.Welfare loss rates compared to baseline scenarios forﬁve aggregated regions in the INDC and 40GtCO2eq scenarios in 2030.
The horizontal axis represents burden-sharing differences.
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will receive the beneﬁt? Thewelfare loss rates inOECD
countries decreased remarkably by implementing
emissions trading, whereas this was not always the case
for non-OECD countries. In some developing coun-
tries welfare would decrease despite the revenue
obtained from exporting the carbon emissions. These
phenomena imply that the market distortion induced
by the carbon price is the primary factor in changing
the macroeconomic performance rather than the
monetary ﬂow associated with emissions trading.
While it is economically efﬁcient globally, whether it is
acceptable to implement the emissions trading system
or not in the real world might be dependent to a large
extent on the equity issue.
The second factor is that if we decide to adopt the
40 Gt pathways without emissions trading, OECD
countries would face quite high carbon prices and
macroeconomic losses in almost all cases (except for
the GDP case). These pathways had a high carbon
price (more than $200 or $300/tCO2) in the near term
in 2030. These values could be interpreted as being
unrealistic. For example, implementing a Japanese
carbon tax faced strong resistance, even at a carbon
price of $3, although many existing climate change
mitigation studies have suggested hundreds of dollars
as a reasonable target for a carbon price in long-term
scenarios. This is absolutely critical when considering
the reality of achieving such a stringent emissions
reduction target. We must somehow implement the
emissions trading system to achieve such a goal. Most
regions would gain from the emissions trading system,
with Sub-Saharan Africa receiving a remarkable bene-
ﬁt. On the other hand, the exact burden-sharing
scheme used affected the distribution of the cost, even
when emissions trading was available. The main con-
clusion obtained from the 40 Gt scenarios was that
OECD countries already had strict emissions targets in
their INDCs, and there was limited potential to further
reduce emissions independently without emissions
trading, with non-OECD countries also requiring a
certain amount of emissions reduction. Therefore,
non-OECD countries would have to reduce their
emissions either through exporting their emission
allowances to OECD countries (e.g., CUM w/ET) or
intensifying their own emissions target (e.g., GDPw/o
ET). The macroeconomic results imply that the emis-
sions trading option is more attractive to non-OECD
countries.
Third, for some regions, especially low-income
countries, a large monetary ﬂow could cause adverse
effects (e.g., via Dutch disease) [44] (see the 40 Gt sce-
narios in SI section 8.5). The appreciated real exchange
rate crowds out manufacturing exports and endogen-
ous growth in the industrial sector. In addition, the
volatility of carbon pricing may disrupt current bal-
ances. The ﬁnancial ﬂow creates rents, and that may
spur unproductive rent-seeking activity. Policy
makersmust consider such possibilities. The quality of
the institution involved seems to be instrumental in
protecting against Dutch disease [45]. Moreover, if
funds are distributed to technologies and sectors exhi-
biting productivity spillover, it could have a positive
effect. Regarding price volatility, Jakob, Steckel [44]
discussed permit allocation and price controls. Con-
sidering issues related to the abovementioned mea-
sures, they proposed a sovereign wealth fund, which
could inter-temporally smooth the price.
Emissions trading may, in fact, be effective in
reducing mitigation costs to achieve near-term NDC
targets, but this is not a crucial step. However, in the
long-term, mechanisms to ensure economic efﬁciency
should be prioritized.
In addition to the model simulation, there are at
least three factors to consider in terms of the interna-
tional policy framework. The ﬁrst factor is how to
avoid the double counting of mitigation efforts. For
example, the CDM should be accounted for as the
developed countries’ emissions reductions, but
national emissions inventories are based on actual
domestic emissions and could fail to attribute the
reductions to the CDM. The second concern is whe-
ther a cooperative mechanism, such as a JCM or mul-
tilateral mechanism, should be adopted. Although the
Paris Agreement includes a JCM, it is unknown whe-
ther a concrete political system, such as a certiﬁcation
system, would work and to what extent the credit
would be transferred. The third factor references so
called non-market-based approaches (NMAs), which
encompass a wide range of development practices
including contributions to sustainable development,
poverty eradication, and adaptation measures. NMAs
can imply emissions permit transfers, but this is hard
to measure. International negotiations are required to
establish the rules for these situations.
This study had several limitations. First, we deal
with 17 aggregated regions in the modeling frame-
work, although this implicitly assumes that emissions
rights can be transferred under the aggregated regions
and sectors. Therefore, the mitigation cost in the sce-
narios without emissions trading could actually be
higher than the estimates in this study. Although it
would be not so critically important to see the global
overview, we should be careful to the speciﬁc aggre-
gated region’s results and regional aggregation may
inﬂuence the results. A similar issue should be con-
sidered for the income loss distribution within each
region (e.g., for each income class).
Second, one of the underlying assumptions was
that advanced technologies can be accessible anywhere
in the world. This assumption enables developing
countries to reduce emissions at a low carbon price.
This would sometimes be true because wages and
many costs in developing countries are cheaper than in
developed countries. However, the technology is only
applicable with a certain skilled labor and access to
such know-how. Therefore, as stated in the Paris
Agreement, the transfer of technologies to developing
countries is necessary.
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Third, implementing emissions trading system
can be costly, andwe did not consider such transaction
costs. One study presented opposing results [46].
However, they investigated cases in the EU and US,
which may not be completely relevant to the current
study, although it is still worthwhile to consider the
implications. As we discussed earlier, MRVwould be a
major cost. The information obtained from this study
should be interpreted as themaximumpotential emis-
sions trading beneﬁt, if emissions trading works at its
most efﬁcient. Therefore, the results of this study
should be considered compared to the cost of emis-
sions trading (opportunity cost), and the ﬁnal costs
and beneﬁts should be evaluated.
The fourth limitation is a more technical issue
regarding the model. The revenues generated from
GHGemission taxes and emissions trading exports are
assumed to be received by a representative household.
If the emission price is relatively high, as in this study,
the amount of money generated by the emission tax
becomes enormous. The saving and expenditure
behavior of the institutional sectors receiving the tax
revenue could then have a large inﬂuence on macro-
economic performance and GHG emission prices. If
this revenue was used for green investments or invest-
ing in other energy technologies, different results
would have been obtained. As discussed by Jakob,
Chen [47], carbon pricing revenue can be used for to
increase infrastructure access. Even if it were insufﬁ-
cient to promote ideal development, such options
should be considered.
Fifth, we only discussed climatemitigation costs in
this study, but climate change impacts risk must be
reduced by speciﬁcmitigation efforts, which should be
considered in decision making. Therefore, the results
of this study should not be interpreted to suggest that
climate change mitigation only generates costs. Cli-
mate change risks might not be obvious in 2030
because of internal climate variability, and while the
short-term beneﬁts would be small, there would be
incredible long-term beneﬁts.
Sixth, there is an uncertainty regarding the socio-
economic and technology assumptions. We con-
ducted a sensitivity analysis for changes in the GDP
and population assumptions (SSP1 and SSP3), as well
as for oil price (GDP, population, and oil price are pre-
sented in the SI section 9). Although the numerical
results slightly differ from the reference scenario, the
main conclusion is robust, and we can conclude that
emissions trading would be essential in the context of
Paris Agreement. Technological assumptions could
change regional relationships regarding cost advan-
tages. Limiting technological assumptions, such as the
Energy Modeling Forum 27 study, is desirable [48].
Furthermore, in this study, we did not reﬂect on each
country’s individual energy information, as was done
in the International Energy Outlook [49] published by
the US Energy Information Administration. Collect-
ing information from all countries is difﬁcult, but it
would be worthwhile to collect data frommajor coun-
tries (i.e., major emitters). Such a treatment could
affect the outcomes, andwe propose this approach as a
topic for further research.
Future studies are expected to follow three direc-
tions. One is to incorporate the 1.5 °Cgoal. This would
require not only a 2030 but also a 2050 or century-
scale assessment. After the Paris Agreement, this
research topic has attracted much attention, but has
not been sufﬁciently analyzed. The other direction
would be tomake amore realistic assessment of energy
technologies and international cooperation.
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